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Judge James D. Hopkins' Philosophy of
Judicial Decision Making and his
Contributions to Appellate Procedural
Reform
ARTHUR KARGER*
The inestimable contributions which Judge James D. Hop-
kins has made to our state's legal system are to be found not
only in the many authoritative judicial opinions by which he
helped to shape the decisional law of this state, but also in a
host of extrajudicial writings. In those writings he has ex-
pounded his philosophy of judicial decision making and, in addi-
tion, has highlighted the threat posed to the continued viability
of our appellate courts by the staggering appellate caseload, and
has proposed various remedies therefore.
I. Judge Hopkins' Philosophy of Judicial Decision Making
In a series of law review articles, Judge Hopkins has
presented a lucid analysis of the various factors on which a judge
may draw to aid him in making the choice of a rule of law for
decision making purposes.' Judge Hopkins described those fac-
tors, in ascending order of importance, as follows: general legal
maxim, legal doctrine, precedent, statute or constitutional provi-
sion, and public policy. Public policy, as he explained, could
serve to shape the construction of a statute, and could also be
the basis for making a choice between two competing rules of
* Chairman, New York State Board of Law Examiners; co-author (with Henry Co-
hen), PowRs oF TH NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS (1952); author, The New York Court
of Appeals: Some Aspects of the Limitations on Its Jurisdiction, 27 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y.
370 (1972).
1. Hopkins, Fictions and the Judicial Process: A Preliminary Theory of Decision,
33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1966); Hopkins, The Formation of Rules: A Preliminary Theory
of Decision, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 165 (1969); Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation
of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 323 (1971).
2. Hopkins, Fictions and the Judicial Process: A Preliminary Theory of Decision,
33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 5-10 (1966).
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law or for fashioning a new rule of law.s
Where there- is no precise precedent or controlling statute
directly on point, the judge will tend to "search for a result con-
sonant with his ideas of justice."4 However, not every judge will
articulate the exact grounds on which he may base his decision
in such a case. Instead, he may invoke some legal fiction or
merely express his conviction in general terms that the result he
has reached is demanded by public policy.'
Judge Hopkins recognized that in filling "the gaps" or "in-
terstitial limits" in the law as a judicial lawmaker,6 the judge is
at a disadvantage as compared to the legislature since he is not
in a position to obtain samplings of public opinion from the citi-
zenry or to take "testimony either within or outside the record"
on the issue of public policy." Nevertheless, as Judge Hopkins
emphasized, it is the judge's function to declare the applicable
public policy where the legislature has failed to do so; it is
through "intuition, which has hardened into certainty," that the
judge's "sense of 'general and well-settled public opinion' is
gathered. '
Judge Hopkins was strongly of the view that it was incum-
bent on the judge, in his judicial lawmaking role, to give a full
and candid explanation of his reasons for choosing a particular
rule of law.9 He further urged that where the choice turns on
considerations of public policy, the judge should not only specifi-
cally articulate the public policy invoked by him, but should also
show that such public policy has sound reasons to support it.10
The choice of a rule of law may thus involve several competing
public policy considerations, and the judge should explain the
reasons which have led him to give overriding importance to one
3. Id. at 6-7, 9.
4. Id. at 11.
5. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 323, 333-34 (1971).
6. See B. CARsozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103, 113-14 (1921).
7. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 323, 332 (1971).
8. Id.
9. Hopkins, Fictions and the Judicial Process: A Preliminary Theory of Decision,
33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1966).
10. Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 323, 333-34 (1971).
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particular policy consideration rather than the other."
The judicial opinions rendered by Judge Hopkins, some in-
volving novel situations, clearly exemplify the principles which
he expounded in his law review articles. His opinions thus ex-
hibit a sensitivity to relevant policy considerations and a dis-
taste for obscurantism or reliance on legal fiction. He invariably
cut through the outer trappings to get at the realities of the situ-
ation and presented a full and fair analysis of relevant compet-
ing policy considerations and of the reasons which led him to the
results he reached. A few examples of his opinions may serve as
illustrations.
Carr v. Carr12 concerned certain death benefits payable to
the surviving spouse of a deceased United States Foreign Service
officer who had died a resident of California. The status of sur-
viving spouse was claimed, on the one hand, by a wife against
whom he had previously obtained a judgment of divorce in Hon-
duras, and, on the other hand, by a second "wife" whom he had
married after such divorce and who was living with him as his
wife at the time of his death.
The divorced wife brought an action in the New York Su-
preme Court against the second "wife" for a declaratory judg-
ment that the Honduras divorce was jurisdictionally invalid and
that the divorced wife was the decedent's lawful surviving
spouse. The second "wife" resided in California and was served
with process in that state by a form of substituted service, pur-
suant to order of the New York Supreme Court. The second
"wife's" motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
was granted at special term, and the appellate division of the
second department reversed in an opinion by Judge Hopkins.
The primary issue was whether there were sufficient con-
tacts between the nonresident defendant and New York to make
it reasonable for New York, as a matter of due process, to com-
pel her to appear in this state to defend the action. As Judge
Hopkins held, the determinative New York contact was pro-
vided by the plaintiff's allegations that she had left the marital
abode in Honduras because of the decedent's cruel and inhuman
11. Id. at 333-35.
12. 60 A.D.2d 63, 400 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dep't 1977), rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d 270, 385
N.E.2d 1234, 413 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1978).
1983]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
treatment and had thereupon moved to New York where she
had assumed a permanent domicile and had lived ever since. As
Judge Hopkins pointed out, the marital res would follow the
wronged wife, with the result that if the decedent were still liv-
ing, the plaintiff would have been able to sue him in New York
to establish her marital status even though he was domiciled and
served with process in California.13
As Judge Hopkins recognized, however, a novel element was
presented by the circumstance that "from a legalistic view, the
marital res in New York no longer existed after. . .[the dece-
dent's] death."' 14 Nevertheless, Judge Hopkins refused to be
bound by the constraints of legal fictions and looked instead to
the realities of the situation. As he pointed out, there was
little, if any, difference under the strictures of due process and
reasonableness in the choice of a forum between the issue of the
validity of the foreign divorce in an action against [the decedent],
if he were living, for a declaration that the plaintiff was his wife,
and the issue of the validity of the foreign divorce in an action
against the defendant for a declaration that the plaintiff was [the
decedent's] lawful surviving widow. New York in either case,.
under the doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Washington...
and Shaffer v. Heitner . . . , maintains a continuing interest in
the determination of its domiciliary's rights in the controversy
over survivor's benefits to entertain the action and to exercise ju-
risdiction over the parties."5
In Ellish v. Airport Parking Co.," the plaintiff, who was
about to leave on a flight from Kennedy Airport, parked her car
in a fenced in parking lot operated by the defendant at the air-
port. When she returned from her flight, her car had disap-
peared. She thereupon brought an action for damages against
the defendant, charging it with liability for the loss.
The parties stipulated that the plaintiff had driven into the
parking lot at the airport, receiving from the automatic vending
machine a ticket stamped with the date and time of entry. The
13. Id. at 69, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citations omitted).
16. 42 A.D.2d 174, 345 N.Y.S.2d 650 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 33 N.Y.2d 764,
305 N.E.2d 490, 350 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1973), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 882, 316 N.E.2d 715, 359
N.Y.S.2d 280 (1974).
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ticket was labeled "License to Park" and stated that the lot was
not attended and that the car should be locked. The plaintiff
then drove her car into a parking space, locked it, and took the
keys with her. Under the defendant's practice, on leaving the lot,
the driver of a car would drive to the point of exit, present the
parking ticket to the cashier and pay the amount due based on
the time elapsed. None of the tickets identified any particular
vehicle. If the driver did not have a ticket, the cashier would
demand proof of ownership of the vehicle.
The parties further stipulated that neither of them had any
knowledge concerning the disappearance of the car, and there
was no proof of neglect by the defendant.
The plaintiff recovered judgement in her favor in the civil
court, but that judgment was reversed by the appellate term and
the complaint dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff, the appel-
late division of the second department affirmed the appellate
term by a three-to-two decision. Judge Hopkins wrote the ma-
jority opinion for the court.
Both the majority and the dissenters agreed that the issue
was whether the transaction constituted a bailment or merely a
license to occupy space. If it was a bailment, there would be a
presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant bailee,
under the common law rule relating to bailments, unless the
bailee came forward with a satisfactory explanation to rebut the
presumption. On the other hand, if the transaction was only a
license to occupy space, there would be no such presumption
and the plaintiff would be required to adduce affirmative evi-
dence of negligence on the defendant's part in order to void dis-
missal of the complaint.
Judge Hopkins, in the majority opinion, took the position
that only a license to occupy space was involved. He emphasized
that the label of bailment "merely describes a result which in
many instances does not flow from the conscious promises of the
parties made in a bargaining process but from what the law re-
gards as a fair approximation of their expections" and that, "in
formulating a rule to determine the extent of the liability of the
defendant, we must concern ourselves with the realities of the
transaction in which the parties engaged. 1 7
17. Id. at 176, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
19831
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Judge Hopkins noted that, unlike "the traditional ware-
houses of the professional bailee with their stress on security
and safekeeping," parking lots such as that in the case at bar
were "designed to meet the need of providing temporary space
in crowded urban centers for a highly mobile means of transpor-
tation," and that it was "important that a fair rule, easy to ap-
ply, should govern."18
Summing up, Judge Hopkins stated as follows:
We are of the opinion that liability should not be determined
by ancient labels and characteristics not connected with present-
day practices. It is one thing for the owner of a livery stable to
have to explain the disappearance of a horse from its stall to the
owner, but it is not at all the same for the operator of a parking
lot at a busy airport to have to explain the disappearance from
the lot of one of the thousands of cars parked there daily. Unless
proof of negligence is present on the part of the operator of the
lot, the risk of loss must be assumed by the owner of the
automobile. 1'
In La Rocca v. Lane,2 0 the petitioner, who was both a Ro-
man Catholic priest and an attorney and who represented a de-
fendant in a criminal case, appeared in his clerical garb for the
trial of the case before a jury. The trial court directed him to
remove his clerical collar before proceeding further in the trial,
and he thereupon instituted a proceeding to restrain the court
from enforcing that direction. He was granted judgment in his
favor in the nisi prius court, and that judgment was reversed by
the appellate division of the second department, by a three-to-
one decision, and the petition dismissed, in an opinion by Judge
Hopkins for the majority. The court of appeals thereafter af-
firmed by a six-to-one decision.
As Judge Hopkins noted in his opinion, the petitioner's first
amendment right to the free exercise of religion had to be bal-
anced against the secular value of preserving the right to a fair
trial. Judge Hopkins carefully reviewed the considerations un-
derlying each of those competing rights, and he reached the
18. Id. at 177, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
19. Id. at 179, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
20. 47 A.D.2d 243, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d
606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
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well-reasoned conclusion that the petitioner's first amendment
right had to yield to the right to a fair trial.
His reasoning was as follows: that there was "hardly a
stronger interest within the governmental structure than the
preservation of the right to a fair trial, both by the accused and
by the prosecution";" that when a clergyman "enters on secular
pursuits he is subject to reasonable regulations in the secular
realm"; 2  and that the petitioner's right to the free exercise of
religion must consequently "yield to the reasonable regulation of
the court when he appears to try a case before a jury. '2 3
In People v. Servidio,4 the defendant challenged his bur-
glary conviction on the ground that inculpatory statements
which he had made pursuant to police interrogation while in
custody should have been suppressed for the reason that they
were made in the absence of his attorney who was representing
him on pending unrelated criminal charges. Prior decisions had
held that the police could not question a person in custody in
the absence of counsel, once an attorney had become involved in
a pending criminal action on that person's behalf, whether re-
lated or unrelated to the charges in connection with which the
challenged questioning occurred.2 5 However, those prior deci-
sions left unresolved the issue whether the prohibition against
such police questioning would be applied if the police did not
have actual knowledge at the time that the person being ques-
tioned was represented by an attorney in the pending unrelated
action.
Affirming the conviction, the appellate division of the sec-
ond department, in an opinion by Judge Hopkins, rejected the
defendant's contentions and held that the police questioning in
the case before it was unobjectionable since there was no show-
ing that the police had had actual, as distinguished from merely
constructive, knowledge of the defendant's being represented by
counsel.
Reviewing the pertinent policy considerations, Judge Hop-
21. Id. at 247, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
22. Id. at 249, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
23. Id.
24. 77 A.D.2d 191, 433 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 951, 429
N.E.2d 821, 445 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1981).
25. See People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
19831
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kins concluded as follows:
'[W]hat is required must always be considered in light of what is
practical under the circumstances.' The balance between the
rights of the individual and the responsibilities of the State will
be fairly maintained if actual knowledge, not constructive knowl-
edge, is the ingredient of the rule forbidding the interrogation of
a suspect when he is represented by counsel on unrelated charges
unknown to the police. This does not mean that the police may
act by subterfuge to conceal such knowledge, or to overlook the
obvious. Equally, it means that the police undertaking the ques-
tioning must be possessed with the knowledge of the prior
representation."'
The court of appeals thereafter unanimously affirmed the appel-
late division's decision,2 7 four judges subscribing to a brief mem-
orandum decision and the other three specifically agreeing "for
the reasons stated by Justice James D. Hopkins at the appellate
division. '28
In other situations, dealing with a comparatively new doc-
trine such as that of strict products liability,29 or a novel appli-
cation of an established concept such as that of proximate
cause,30 Judge Hopkins has taken pains, in his opinion, to ex-
plain not only the reasons for the decision, but also its implica-
tions and ramifications.
The positions espoused by Judge Hopkins in opinions writ-
ten by him, whether for the majority or in a limited concurrence
or a dissent, have generally found acceptance in the court of ap-
peals.31 However, that has not always been so. On occasion, the
26. 77 A.D.2d at 197, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 174 (citing People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458,
464, 377 N.E.2d 721, 724, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 271 (1978)).
27. 54 N.Y.2d 951, 429 N.E.2d 821, 445 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1981).
28. Id. at 954, 429 N.E.2d at 823, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
29. Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 A.D.2d 344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2d Dep't 1974).
30. Pagan v. Goldberger, 51 A.D.2d 508, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549 (2d Dep't 1976).
31. See La Rocca v. Lane, 47 A.D.2d 243, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 37
N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976);
People v. Servidio, 77 A.D.2d 191, 433 N.Y.S.2d 169 (2d Dep't 1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d
951, 429 N.E.2d 821, 445 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1981); Douglaston Civic Ass'n Inc. v. Galvin, 43
A.D.2d 739, 350 N.Y.S.2d 708 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364
N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974); State Div. of Human Rights v. Luppino, 35 A.D.2d 107, 313
N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't 1970) (Hopkins, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. 29 N.Y.2d 555, 272
N.E.2d 884, 324 N.Y.S. 297 (1971); People v. Bailey, 28 A.D.2d 126, 282 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d
Dep't 1967) (Hopkins, J., dissenting), rev'd, 21 N.Y.2d 588, 237 N.E.2d 205, 289 N.Y.S.2d
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views expressed by him on important questions of policy have
not prevailed in the court of appeals, though sometimes winning
the support of dissenters in that court. Thus, in Sackler v.
Sackler,32 Judge Hopkins dissented in a divorce action on the
ground that the strictures of the fourth amendment required the
exclusion of evidence of adultery obtained by the husband's ille-
gal focible entry into the wife's home. The court of appeals re-
jected Judge Hopkins' views, by a five-to-two decision, holding
that the fourth amendment had traditionally not been applied
to the actions of "private litigants" in civil cases. 3
Another example is Lastowski v. Norge Coin-O-Matic,
Inc.,u which involved the question whether, in an action
brought by a father on behalf of his unemancipated infant child
against a third party to recover damages for injuries sustained
by the child as a result of the negligence of the third party, the
latter could counterclaim against the father for contribution on
the basis of the father's alleged negligence in failing properly to
supervise the child.
The majority of the appellate division held that the coun-
terclaim was insufficient as a matter of law on the ground that
there was no tort liability on the part of a parent for negligent
failure to supervise properly an unemancipated child. Judge
Hopkins dissented in a lengthy opinion in which he reviewed the
pertinent policy considerations and reached the opposite conclu-
sion. The same question was thereafter decided by the court of
appeals in other litigation, contrary to Judge Hopkins' views, by
a five-to-two decision."
In any event, regardless of his "batting average" in the
court of appeals, there can be no doubt as to the high regard in
which Judge Hopkins is held in that court and elsewhere. As an
example, it may be noted that in a recent decision of the court
of appeals in a case involving the concept of proximate cause,
Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, in his opinion for the full court,
cited, as authority for a certain proposition, Judge Hopkins'
943 (1968).
32. 16 A.D.2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't 1962), affd, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d
481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
33. Id. 15 N.Y.2d at 43, 203 N.E.2d at 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
34. 44 A.D.2d 127, 355 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d Dep't 1974).
35. Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
1983]
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opinion in Pagan v. Goldberger,3 and specifically noted in pa-
renthesis that it was an opinion by "Hopkins, Acting P.J.,"
thereby signifying that the opinion was entitled to especially
great weight because of the stature of its author.
II. Judge Hopkins' Contributions to Appellate Procedural
Reform
Judge Hopkins was one of the first forceful spokesmen to
call attention to the critical situation created by the ever in-
creasing appellate caseload and to propose appropriate reme-
dies. 7 As he made clear in his writings, no appellate court, no
matter how competent, could long continue to function effi-
ciently and maintain high-quality standards in the face of such
an overwhelming avalanche of appeals."8 Some of the remedies
which he proposed have become established features of the prac-
tice, but he has continued to press for more far-reaching
changes.3 9
The dimensions of the problem have become even more se-
rious in recent years, and they were delineated in a recent study,
entitled "Appellate Justice in New York," sponsored by the
American Judicature Society, on which Judge Hopkins collabo-
rated with Robert MacCrate and Professor Maurice Rosenberg.4 0
In that study, it was noted that the aggregate caseload of the
four appellate divisions in this state had increased by over 200%
during the twenty-year period from 1960 to 1980.41 Indeed, the
percentage of increase was even greater for Judge Hopkins'
court, the appellate division of the second department, which
disposed of a record number of 3502 appeals in 1980, as com-
pared with 730 appeals decided by it twenty years earlier in the
36. 51 A.D.2d 508, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549 (2d Dep't 1976).
37. Hopkins, Small Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 551 (1972); Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appel-
late Court, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 459 (1975); Hopkins, The Winds of Change: New
Styles in the Appellate Process, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1975).
38. Hopkins, Small Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 551, 555, 556 (1972); Hopkins, The Winds of Change: New
Styles in the Appellate Process, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 652 (1975).
39. R. MACCRATE, J. HOPKINS, M. ROSENBERG, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK 55-
56, 67-71, 86-88, 117-19 (American Judicature Society 1982).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 56-57.
[Vol. 3:535
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/8
APPELLATE REFORM
1959-1960 court year.' 2 That huge volume of appeals, coupled
with an additional annual workload of some 8000 motions, make
it the busiest appellate tribunal in this state and one of the busi-
est in this country.'8
The volume of appellate business of the court of appeals has
likewise undergone an enormous increase during the past two
decades-from 399 appeals decided in the 1959-1960 court year
to 722 decided in 1982." Adding to that court's burdens is a
huge volume of motions in civil cases, which numbered 1329 in
1982, and applications for leave to appeal in criminal cases, de-
cided by individual judges of the court, which numbered 1863 in
1982."
The proposals which Judge Hopkins advanced were directed
at the entire appellate court system, and not merely at the court
in which he sat. He felt that it was essential to streamline the
appellate process, for the benefit of the litigants and the bar as
well as of the appellate courts, and to ease the burden of those
courts so as to promote their efficient functioning and guard
against any sacrifice of quality in their operations."
One proposal, which was strongly championed by Judge
Hopkins as well as by others, and which is now widely accepted,
is that of the "hot court," whereby the judges of the panel as-
signed to hear an appeal become acquainted with the issues in
each case prior to argument by reading the briefs.4 That prac-
tice, which is now followed by the court of appeals as well as by
each of the appellate divisions, reduces argument time and en-
hances the value of oral argument for both the judges and coun-
sel by enabling them to focus attention on the critical issues in
the case.
Another of Judge Hopkins' proposals, the gist of which has
since been adopted, was to require that the appellate court be
apprised of the pendency of an appeal promptly after service of
42. Id.
43. Id. at 61-62.
44. Id. at 63-64; see also, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, 5, app. I (1982).
45. Id. at 12, 13.
46. Hopkins, Small Sparks From a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 551, 559 (1972).
47. Id. at 558.
1983]
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the notice of appeal in order to enable the appellate court to
monitor the expeditious prosecution of the appeal.4 The notice
of appeal has traditionally been filed only with the clerk of the
nisi prius court, and, under the prior practice, the appellate
court would not learn of the appeal until one of the parties acti-
vated the appeal or moved for some relief before the court."
Under practice changes made by the appellate divisions of
the first and second departments, the appellant is now required
to file, with the notice of appeal, a pre-argument statement of
the nature of the case and the issues presented by the appeal,
and the clerk of the nisi prius court is directed to forward that
statement to the appellate division together with a copy of the
notice of appeal. Pre-argument conferences with counsel are
scheduled shortly thereafter for discussion of the possibility of
settlement and narrowing of the issues for the appeal."0
A somewhat similar practice has also been adopted by the
court of appeals. Under that practice, the appellant is required
to file a so-called jurisdictional statement with the court of ap-
peals within ten days after the appeal is taken. That statement
must set forth, among other things, the issues presented by the
appeal and a showing that the court has jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal and to review the issues raised. It is also required
that the statement be accompanied by copies of the notice of
appeal, any opinions below and other pertinent papers.5 1 The
filing of such statement and accompanying papers enables the
court to identify and dismiss, on its own motion, at the thresh-
old stage, appeals of which the court has no jurisdiction and
which should never have been taken.2
In an effort to conserve judicial resources for the considera-
tion of important cases, Judge Hopkins also proposed that there
should be a preliminary screening of pending appeals in order to
select for oral argument only those appeals which present issues
worthy of such argument, and that appeals not so selected
should be submitted for decision without oral argument.53
48. Id. at 559-60.
49. Id. at 559.
50. NEw YORK COURT RULES §§ 600.17, 670.28 (McKinney 1982).
51. Id. § 500.2.
52. Id. § 500.2(f).
53. Hopkins, Small Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
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Though no such practice has been adopted by the appellate divi-
sions, the court of appeals has adopted a rule, which became ef-
fective on January 1, 1982, establishing a pre-argument screen-
ing procedure, whereby appeals not deemed to merit full briefing
and oral argument are set aside for summary consideration and
decision by the court without oral argument. 4
Such appeals are summarily decided by the court of appeals
on the basis of the appellate division record and briefs, any
opinions in the courts below, and such additional written sub-
missions on the merits as counsel may file. The pertinent rule of
the court of appeals provides that appeals may be selected for
such summary procedure "on the basis of (i) nonreviewable dis-
cretion or affirmed findings of fact, (ii) clear recent controlling
precedent, (iii) narrow issues of law not of overriding or state-
wide importance, (iv) nonpreserved issues of law, or (v) other
appropriate categories." 55
According to the Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals for 1982, of the 722 appeals decided by that court dur-
ing that year, 229 consisted of selected appeals decided on such
summary submissions without oral argument.56 A somewhat sim-
ilar practice is also followed by the United States Supreme
Court whereby summary dispositions are made on the merits
without oral argument in selected cases in the exercise of the
Court's review of applications for certiorari.57
Judge Hopkins has, in addition, advocated other, more radi-
cal remedies which would limit the availability of appeal as of
right in certain areas and substitute a practice requiring permis-
sion to appeal. Thus, he has been a strong champion of a propo-
sal to eliminate all appeals as of right to the court of appeals
and to provide that court, instead, with a certiorari-type juris-
diction, analogous to that of the United States Supreme Court,
which would permit appeals to be taken only by its permission.5
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 551, 558 (1972).
54. Nzw YORK COURT RULES § 500.2(g) (McKinney 1982). Prior to the adoption of
this rule, a similar practice was followed by the court on an experimental basis, begin-
ning in November, 1980. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 7.
55. Nzw YORK COURT RULES § 500.2(g)(2) (McKinney 1982).
56. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, at 8.
57. See STERN & GRESMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 220-26 (4th ed. 1969).
58. Hopkins, Small Sparks From a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
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In a similar vein, Judge Hopkins has likewise proposed to limit
the availability of appeals as of right to the appellate division
from intermediate or interlocutory orders.'9 Both of these pro-
posals, which have also been advanced by others, have recently
been endorsed by the court of appeals. 60
Judge Hopkins has also suggested limitations on the availa-
bility of appeals in criminal cases after a plea of guilty or where
only the severity of the sentence is being challenged."1 He has
further proposed that the courts should be relieved of the bur-
den of reviewing administrative agency decisions where the issue
is whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and
that such review should be handled by an administrative board
of review rather than by the courts.6
Judge James D. Hopkins has truly been our Man for All
Seasons: a great jurist in the highest traditions of the common
law, a judicial philosopher, an innovative architect of urgently
needed appellate procedural reform, and a law school dean. It is
indeed a privilege to join in Pace Law Review's tribute to him.
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 551, 555 (1972); R. MAcCRATE, J. HOPKINS & M. ROSEN-
BERG, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK 76-77, 117.
59. Hopkins, Small Sparks From a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 551, 555 (1972).
60. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 44, App. 20(a), at 3-4, 7.
61. Hopkins, Small Sparks From a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate
Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 551, 561 (1972).
62. Hopkins, Appellate Overload: Prognosis, Diagnosis, and Analeptic (1980)
(unpublished).
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